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Business groups form an important part of the Indian private sector; in 1993, group affiliated
firms accounted for more than 80% of the private sector’s assets, profits and sales (Khanna,
1997). Indian business groups are typically very diversified collections of legally independent
firms that usually have a large proportion of family ownership. They contain up to more than
80 firms, which are typically clustered in several industries. Their origin often dates back to
the colonial “managing agency” system, where the managing agency controlled large
numbers of companies across a range of industries. The companies affiliated to a business
group are often linked through cross-holdings of equity and interlocking directorates, and
usually emphasize a common identity.
Why is the business group such a widespread phenomenon? One possible explanation
is that in the presence of severe market imperfections, a business group may be a second-best
efficient organizational form (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). Their scale and scope allow
business groups to replicate functions that are performed by (financial) institutions in
developed countries. Therefore, with ill-functioning capital markets, business groups may
play an important role in generating and allocating funds to investment projects, two of the
main functions of the capital market. With respect to corporate investment, this may imply
that business group affiliates may have better access to external capital, either from within the
group or from outside the group.
In a developing country like India, informational imperfections abound, preventing the
capital market from functioning efficiently. Therefore, especially in developing countries,
business groups may act as an intermediate between firms and markets.
From a theoretical perspective, business group affiliation may enhance a firm’s access
to external capital in two ways. The first way to improve access to external capital is that
banks may be more willing to lend to a business group affiliate. One of the main
characteristics of business groups is the existence of financial relationships between affiliated
firms. These relationships take the form of cross-holdings of equity, interfirm loans, or mutual
debt guarantees. These financial interlinkages may serve to mitigate moral hazard problems2
within the group (Berglöf and Perotti, 1994) or may be an effective means of risk sharing,
because of the diversified nature of business groups. In markets rendered imperfect by
asymmetric information, group membership can act as a signal of relative stability in cash
flows, reducing the harmful affects of adverse selection (Gangopadhyay and Lensink, 2001).
Together with the existence of debt-guarantees, it may reduce the probability of financial
distress. Reputational effects are also likely to play a role; business group affiliation may
serve as a quality sign, or familiarity with other firms of the same group may induce a creditor
to be more willing to lend to a firm. Especially in a developing country like India,
reputational effects may be of great importance, since the absence of a smoothly functioning
and reliable legal system may make contract enforcement via a court very costly.
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Secondly, a firm may be able to obtain funding from other group companies. One can
think of this in analogy to an internal capital market in a diversified firm. With respect to the
efficient allocation of capital to productive uses, the business group structure may have
informational advantages. Because the group superstructure, often consisting of the CEO’s of
the affiliated companies, has better access to firm specific information and may be more
suited for enforcing the disclosure of information, it may do a better job in allocating funds
than the capital market. However, the allocation of funds through intra-firm loans may be of
limited size within a business group, because the affiliated firms are legally separate. To the
extent that there does exist some internal allocation of funds, the business group may gain
from its superior information. There is some empirical evidence that intra-group loans are
substantial (Khanna and Yafeh, 1999). Moreover, as Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) argue, the
informational problems are likely to be severe in India, whereas the agency problems may be
partly relieved by the alignment of incentives through reciprocal equity holdings and family
ownership. On average, the advantages of a business group’s internal capital market may
outweigh the inefficiencies through moral hazard problems. If business groups provide a
relatively efficient allocation mechanism, this may also help the business group affiliates in
generating external funds.3
We hypothesize, therefore, that business group affiliates may have better access to
external funds. Although there is some literature on Indian business groups and on the
investment behavior of Indian firms (for references, see Section 2), our paper is to our
knowledge the first to combine these two issues.
2 We explicitly look at the effect of business
group affiliation on investment spending in India.
We compare the investment behavior of business group affiliates with that of stand-
alone companies and test the hypothesis that group affiliated firms are less capital constrained
than stand-alone companies. We test for the presence of capital constraints by estimating the
cash flow sensitivity of investment spending, taking the firm’s cash flow as a proxy for
internal funds. The data set we use contains 684 Indian listed companies, from 1989 to 1997.
Using a OLS fixed effects as well as a GMM-estimator to estimate a dynamic investment
equation, we find evidence that cash flow has a positive effect on investment spending of
stand-alone firms, whereas for group affiliates, cash flow is insignificant. This is in line with
our hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give an example of one
of the business groups in India, the Tata group. Although business groups differ considerably
in India, this example gives some insights into the organizational structure that is the main
focus in our paper. Section 3 reviews the related literature. Section 4 describes the data and
gives some descriptive statistics. In section 5, our estimation results are presented. In section
6 these results are discussed. Section 7 concludes.
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The Tata Group is the largest and most distinguished business group in India. Starting in 1874
with a single textile mill, the group nowadays contains more than 80 firms in seven main
business sectors (materials, engineering, energy, chemicals, consumer products,
communications and information systems, and services). In 1995, it had sales of Rs. 220
billion and 270,000 employees and it has a leadership position in many industries.
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The founder of the Tata Group, Jamshedji Tata, already started to expand his industries
to steel, hydroelectric power, modern manufacturing methods, and technical education and
research. Tata Sons Ltd., which now is the principal investment holding company of the Tata
Group, was the promoter of many new ventures in the first half of the twentieth century and
continued to promote and manage all major Tata Group companies until 1970. After this, the
managing agency system was abolished, and the group was no longer a legal construct.
A lot of interdependence remained, however, and Tata Sons still offers the Tata
companies consultancy, management, and financial services. Tats Sons is also the proprietor
of the Tata brand name, which is a registered trademark for a variety of product classes. The
Tata brand name is one of the most valuable assets of the Tata Group. Tata Sons is not only
the proprietor of this name, but is also responsible for promoting it at a central level.
Companies that want to use this name have to subscribe to the Tata Brand Equity Scheme,
implying the payment of a fee and the subscription to a code of conduct, ensuring high
standards of quality and ethical business practices.
The Tata Sons Ltd. Board is made up of the chairpersons or CEOs of major operating
Tata Group companies, and the elected chair of the Board of Tata Sons is recognized as the
Group Chairman.
The main Tata companies are Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company (Telco),
Tata Iron and Steel Company (Tisco), Tata Power, Associated Cement Company (ACC), Tata
Chemicals, Tata Tea, and Indian Hotels. Together, these companies account for more than 80
percent of the Tata group’s sales. The relative independence of these companies is illustrated
by the fact that they diversified into new businesses, sometimes with little coordination. There
exist cross-holdings of equity between these companies and Tata Sons. In 1996, Tata Sons
held a minority stake in these companies varying from 3 to 13 percent; the Tata companies
together owned almost 13 percent of Tata Sons. Moreover, there is a lot of activity between
these and other Tata group companies. In some cases, this takes the form of intra-group loans,
but more often firms invest in other group companies or new ventures. These companies are
not only related through financial ties. Very often, they also have interlocking directorates, so5
that a relatively small group of managers and directors controls a large part of the group
companies.
Many of the new ventures are set up by another important part of the Tata Group, Tata
Industries Ltd. (TIL). This holding company, which was established in 1945, was the
managing agency for the Tata Group until 1970. In 1983, following the preparation of a long-
term strategic plan, Tata Industries pioneered the entry of the Tata Group into several new
sectors (advanced electronics, biotechnology, advanced materials, and alternative energy).
These sectors were expected to have a significant impact on India’s economy in the future.
Since then, Tata Industries has functioned as the catalyst for the introduction of new
businesses within the Tata Group. These ventures were often partly financed by Tata Sons
and the main Tata Group companies. TIL generally maintained a 10 to 20 percent stake in
these new ventures.
Another way in which the Tata Group companies cooperate is in the recruitment of
talented managers by Tata Administrative Services (TAS). New TAS officers are encouraged
to rotate among the Tata companies, and to take advantage of the opportunity to work in
several industries. The TAS program was set up in order to increase the mobility of







Since the seminal paper by Fazzari  
 (1988), a large literature has emerged on the
relationship between internal funds and corporate investment. For an overview of this
literature, see Lensink, Bo, and Sterken (2001). A general finding of this literature is the
importance of internal funds as a determinant of investment spending. The higher the cost
difference between internal and external funds, the more a firm will have to rely on its own
funds.
Most of this literature concentrates on developed countries. However, the issues of
financing constraints and access to capital markets are likely to be even more relevant in6
developing countries. Still, there are relatively few investment studies for developing
countries.
Most of the literature takes the following approach. The sample is divided according to
an  
  measure of financing constraints, after which the investment-cash flow
sensitivities of the different subsamples are compared. One of the selection criteria which
have been used, and which we will use in this paper, is business group affiliation. Hoshi 
.
(1991) were the first to use business group affiliation as a selection criteria. They compare the
investment of Japanese keiretsu firms with stand-alone companies. They estimate an
investment equation by regressing investment on liquidity, Tobin’s , and lagged production.
They find evidence that keiretsu firms, who typically have strong relationships with a main
bank, are less sensitive to fluctuations in their internal funds than firms that do not have such
a relationship. They interpret this as evidence that the keiretsu structure mitigates information
problems, i.e., that keiretsu firms suffer less from market imperfections. Looking at Korean
chaebols, Shin and Park (1999) find that chaebol firms’ investment decisions are independent
of internal funds, while investments of non-chaebol firms are significantly (positively)
sensitive to internal funds. They also find evidence for the existence of internal capital
markets in chaebols, which may explain why investment spending is independent of internal
funds. This is interpreted as evidence that the asymmetric information problems between
firms within the same chaebol are reduced. Shin and Park use liquidity, Tobin’s , and lagged
sales growth as regressors. Their sample consists only of two years, 1994 and 1995, which
leaves them only one observation per firm. Other examples of studies that compare the
investment behavior of group members and stand-alone firms are Perotti and Gelfer (2001) on
Russian financial industrial groups and Hermes and Lensink (1998) on Chilean Grupo’s. The
evidence they find is consistent with Hoshi 
. All studies find that for group affiliates, the
effect of internal funds on investment is lower than for stand-alone firms.
So, despite the different countries and the differences in institutional structures, the
outcomes of these studies are quite uniform. We can therefore conclude that there is some7
empirical evidence that asymmetric information problems are less detrimental to group
affiliated firms, at least with respect to corporate investment.


We are not the first to estimate an investment equation for a panel of Indian firms. However,
none of these studies consider the effect of business group affiliation on investment
spending.
4 Athey and Laumas (1994) use a sample of 256 firms from 1978 and 1986 to
estimate the sensitivity of investment to internal funds in a simple sales accelerator model.
They find that internal funds are relatively more important for large firms and firms that
produce luxury goods. They explain the greater sensitivity of large firms’ investment by
Indian industrial policy, which stimulates small-scale enterprises. This preferential treatment
makes small firms less financially constrained than large firms.
Athey and Reeser (2000) estimate a q-model of investment, using a sample of 142
firms from 1981 to 1986. They divide their sample into three groups – small firms, large firms
with limited access to capital markets, and large firms with easy access to capital markets.
The latter group consists of firms that are very large or belong to of one of the top three
business groups (Tata, Birla, and Mafatlal). They hypothesize that these firms will suffer less
from asymmetric information problems. They find that internal funds are unimportant for
small firms and the large firms with easy access to capital markets, whereas investment of
large firms with limited access to capital markets is sensitive to internal funds.
Instead of using size a criterion for firm classification, Ganesh-Kumar et al. (2001)
classify their sample of Indian firms according to outward orientation. They conjecture that
export-oriented firms will face lower costs of external funds, and thus have lower investment-
cash flow sensitivity.  They argue that size is not a useful criterion in developing countries,
because more assets only have a higher collateral value if the assets are marketable. This
marketability may be problematic in developing countries.  They use export orientation as a
criterion, arguing that a higher export orientation means a greater ability to compete in world
markets. In the new, liberalized Indian environment, the ability to compete in world markets8
may be an important determinant of investment project quality. Therefore, these firms may
face lower costs of external funds. Using a GMM approach, they estimate an investment
equation with lagged sales and cash flow as regressors. The authors find evidence that is
consistent with their conjecture, i.e., investment spending of exporting firms is less sensitive
to cash flow than that of domestic firms.
Eastwood and Kohli (1999) study the promotion of small-scale industry in India by
directed bank lending. They find that large firms with new investment opportunities could
obtain additional external finance, whereas small firms could not. This suggests that small
firms were more financially constrained than large firms were. Moreover, the evidence
suggests that the rise in bank lending has raised investment spending.
Recently, Khanna and Palepu (2000) have compared the performance of business group
affiliates in India with that of stand-alone firms. They find that only above a certain degree of
diversification, group diversification is beneficial to its members. Below this threshold, stand-
alone firms perform better than group affiliates. They find evidence that group affiliated firms
have disproportionately good access to international source of capital. These firms issue more
global depository rights (GDRs) and are more closely followed by foreign financial analysts.
Referring to the potential value creation of internal capital markets, they find no evidence that
the role of internal capital markets differs between group affiliates and stand-alone
companies. They find strong investment-cash flow sensitivities for all firms, and no
difference between group affiliates and stand-alone firms. This suggests that the benefits of
business group affiliation are in generating capital rather than in allocating it. So, they
conclude that internal capital markets play no role in Indian business groups. However, this
conclusion is based on a (not specified) estimated investment function using data for one year
only. Since investment is by its nature a dynamic problem, it is interesting to see what the
result will be if the investment function is estimated on a panel of Indian companies in which




The variables are extracted from the CIMM database of the Center for Monitoring the Indian
Economy (CMIE). We have yearly data for the 1989-1997 period. Constructing a balanced set
resulted in a sample of 684 firms, of which 455 are group related and 229 are private.
5 Since
the dependent variable is net investment, derived by taking the first difference of net fixed
assets, the first year of observations (1989) is not taken into account in the estimates. So, the
basic data set contains 684 firms with 8 observations.
In tables 1 and 2, we give some descriptive statistics about our sample of firms. Panel
A of table 1 shows that, on average, group affiliated firms are significantly larger than stand-
alone firms. Moreover, group affiliates are older, have a lower debt-to-assets ratio, and have
higher sales. The performance of group affiliates, measured by their return on assets (ROA),
appears to be slightly better then that of stand-alone companies. This result is probably not
very robust, since we used only a crude measure of ROA. Moreover, Khanna and Palepu
(2000) find that the relationship between performance and group affiliation is non-linear.
The differences in firm size, age, and leverage warrants some further discussion, since
differences in these variables may affect the degree to which a firm is capital constrained.
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Differences in cash-flow sensitivities between group affiliates and stand-alone firms may
therefore be attributed to the underlying differences in size, age and leverage. We tried to get
a clearer picture of the relationships between these variables by regressing group affiliation on
firm size, age and leverage.
7 From this we find that firm size is very significant, whereas the
age of a firm is not significant once one controls for firm size.
Panel B gives some insights into the ownership structure of business group affiliates
relative to that of stand-alone firms. The most remarkable difference is that a larger part of
group affiliates’ equity is held by other companies, whereas in stand-alone companies, the
directors hold a larger stake.
Although a more detailed picture of equity ownership is needed, the results in table 1
are consistent with the anecdotal evidence about the importance of cross-equity holdings in
business groups. If we interpret both corporate ownership and directors’ ownership as10
measures of insider ownership, the figures also suggest that insider ownership is not confined
to business groups. Thus, expropriation of minority shareholders may be present in both
group affiliates and stand-alone companies.
From table 2, we can see that there are some remarkable differences in the composition
of corporate debt between group affiliates and stand-alone firms. Stand-alone firms rely more
on bank debt as a source of funding. This difference is highly significant both for the mean
and for the median. This does not support the hypothesis that banks may be more willing to
lend to group affiliates.
We can also see from table 2 that group affiliates borrow more from companies that are
affiliated to the same group. This difference is also significant in both panels. This provides
some evidence for intra-group loans. However, we should note that intra-group loans make up
only one percent of total borrowings, suggesting that the size of intra-group loans is limited.
Group affiliates also borrow more from foreign investors. Again, this difference is significant,
but very small. The overall evidence form table 2 is not very conclusive.
In order to estimate the cash flow sensitivity for our sample of firms, in the next section
we present estimates of a simple investment equation. In the basic regressions, net investment
scaled by the beginning-of-period total assets () is explained by sales scaled by the
beginning-of-period total assets () and cash flow scaled by the beginning-of-period total
assets (). Table 3 gives some descriptive statistics of the variables for the total data set as
well as for the sub-samples of group affiliates and stand-alone companies. From table 3, we
see that the most remarkable difference between group related and stand-alone firms is the
much higher standard deviation of net investment for stand-alone companies.
Table 4 gives a correlation matrix of the main variables for the different groups of
firms. The most significant difference between the group related and the stand-alone firms
concerns the correlation coefficient between cash flow and net investment. For group related
firms this is much lower than for stand-alone firms. In the next section we will argue that the
investment-cash-flow sensitivity may be used as a measure of financing constraints. The more
a firm is financially constrained, the more will investment be sensitive to a measure of11
internal funds, such as cash flow. The much lower correlation coefficient between net
investment and cash flow for group related firms might therefore be a first indication that
group affiliates suffer less from financing constraints than stand-alone companies.
	  !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We estimate a fairly standard accelerator cum cash-flow investment model, where cash flow
is a measure of internal funds. The base equation we estimate reads as follows:
I/A = α 1 + β 1 S/A + β 2 (CF/A)*D1+ β 3 (CF/A)*(1-D1)+ ε (1)
whereis net investment, measured as the change in net fixed assets,  is beginning-of-period
total assets, is cash flow and  ε  is an error term.  !is a group affiliation dummy, taking
value 1 if the firm is related to a business group, and 0 if it is a stand-alone firm.
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Cash flow is added to the model to examine the effects of capital market imperfections.
The idea is that, in the case of financial constraints, investment will be sensitive to internal
funds. By comparing the investment-cash flow sensitivity of different groups of firms (i.e.,
comparing β 2, for group affiliates, and β 3, for stand-alone firms) it is then possible to test
which type of firm is more financially constrained (see,  Fazzari 
(1988)).
First, we estimate equation (1) using ordinary least squares. The equation is estimated
in first differences (to account for fixed effects), and time dummies for the entire estimation
period are taken into account. The result of this estimation is presented in table 5, column 1.
The sales coefficient has the expected sign and is significant. The cash flow coefficient
appears to be insignificant for group affiliates, whereas it is significantly positive for stand-
alone firms. This clearly suggests that stand-alone firms are more financially constrained then
group firms, and is thus consistent with our hypothesis.
As we saw in section 3, group-firms are typically bigger and older than stand-alone
firms are. One may argue that these differences between the two sub-samples drive our result.12
In order to correct for this possibility, we next distinguish firms by means of a size and an age
indicator.
We estimate the following equations:
"α ￿#β ￿#β ￿$%& '#β ￿$%&$! '%#ε $'%
"α ￿#β ￿#β ￿$%& (#β ￿$%&$! (%#ε $(%
where D2 is a dummy with value 1 if total assets of a firm is below the average total assets of
all firms (2036.18), and 0 otherwise. D3 is a dummy with value 1 if the age of a firm is below
the average age of all firms (below 34), and 0 otherwise.
9
The results of these estimates are shown in columns 2 and 3 of table 5. Again, we find
that sales has a significantly positive effect on investment. Furthermore, we find lower cash
flow coefficients for smaller firms and for younger firms. Quite interestingly, this suggests
that smaller and younger firms are less capital constrained than bigger and older firms. This
finding is consistent with Athey and Laumas (1994), who find that small firms are less capital
constrained than large firms.
However, we are not so much interested in the effect of size and age on investment-
cash flow sensitivities per se, as we are in separating the effects of size and age from that of
group affiliation. Therefore, we finally distinguish four groups, based on two indicators: the
dummy for group affiliation on the one hand and the dummy for size or age on the other hand.
We estimate the following models:
"α ￿#β ￿#β ￿$%& !& '#β ￿$%& !&$! '%
#β ￿$%&$! !%& '#β ￿$%&$! !%&$! '%#ε $)%
"α ￿#β ￿#β ￿$%& !& (#β ￿$%& !&$! (%
#β ￿$%&$! !%& (#β ￿$%&$! !%&$! (%#ε $*%13
The results of these estimations can be found in columns 4 and 5 of table 5. From
column 4, we can conclude that both small and large group-affiliates have lower cash flow
sensitivities than their stand-alone counterparts. This is fully in line with our hypothesis. The
same conclusion can be drawn from column 5 for older firms. These results are interesting
and also confirm our hypothesis that group firms are less capital constrained than stand-alone
firms. A puzzling result from column 5 is that for young, group-related firms the cash flow
coefficient is even negative, whereas it is insignificant for young, stand-alone firms.
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Estimating our models using ordinary least squares might be problematic due to
measurement and endogeneity problems. Therefore, we also estimate our models using an
instrumental variable approach. The instrumental variable estimation technique controls for
the fact that the explanatory variables are likely to be correlated with the error term and the
firm-specific effect, and deals with possible endogeneity problems. More specifically, we
estimate the investment models with the system generalized methods of moments (GMM)
estimator, using a new version of DPD98 for Gauss (Arellano and Bond, 1998). For details
about this technique we refer to the appendix.
The results of the GMM estimation are presented in table 6, where the five columns
again refer to the five models that were presented above. The results for the accelerator effect
are disappointing, since in all five models, the coefficient for sales is not significant at the
10% level.
11 We interpret this as strong evidence for the endogeneity of sales.
From column 1, we can conclude that cash flow is insignificant for group affiliates,
whereas it is positively significant for stand-alone firms; a conclusion that is in line with our
hypothesis. The results of columns 2 and 3 are consistent with the OLS estimates, in that they
suggest that younger and smaller firms have better access to external capital.  The results
reported in column 4 also confirm our OLS results. Group affiliation implies a lower cash
flow coefficient, irrespective of firm size. In column 5, we find that this result also holds for
younger firms, whereas older firms’ cash flow coefficients are roughly the same for group
affiliates and stand-alone companies.
1214
In general, we can say that, although there is a large difference between the size of the
coefficients from the OLS and GMM estimations, the basic message is similar: in most of the
cases group affiliates are less financially constrained than stand-alone firms.
13
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Although the above mentioned methodology has been followed by numerous researchers, it is
not undisputed. To value our results it is important to have a closer look at these critiques.
The main critique focuses on three issues; the (time independent) 
classification of
firms in different groups, the problem that internal funds may also proxy for the profitability
of investment and the use of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial
constraints.
Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) criticize the 
classification of firms. They point at
three possible weaknesses of this approach. First, financing constraints are likely to be
determined by a number of factors. A single indicator may not be able to distinguish between
the effect of financing constraints and firm-specific effects. Second, the financing constraints
may differ per year. This may especially be the case when the macroeconomic environment
changes dramatically over time. Finally, the variable used to select firms may be correlated
with the dependent variable, in which case the analysis suffers from selection bias. To address
these weaknesses Hu and Schianterelli propose to estimate an endogenous switching model,
where the premium on external finance is endogenously determined by a switching function.
We believe, however, that our classification is immune to this critique. First, we are not
so much interested in finding all the factors that determine the financing constraints a firm
faces Our primary interest is in the difference in financing constraints between stand-alone
firms and group members. Second, business group affiliation does not seem to change a lot
over time, at least not over the period in our sample. Third, business group affiliation seems to
be a truly exogenous variable. We think this is the most important difference between using
size or age as a classification criterion and classifying firms according to business group15
affiliation. Whereas it seems obvious that the size of a firm is partly determined by its
investment, we cannot think of such a causal link from investment to group affiliation.
Some authors argue that the relationship between investment and measures for internal
funds may suffer from the fact that internal funds may proxy for the profitability of
investment. In that case, a positive relationship between internal funds and investment may be
expected since firms with more liquidity are doing well and have better possibilities to invest
((Hoshi, 
, 1991). This may imply that the cash flow coefficient cannot be interpreted in
terms of capital market imperfections. The usual way to get around this problem is to add
Tobin’s q as an independent variable. Although we agree with the possibility that the cash
flow sensitivity may provide a weak indication of the existence of capital market
imperfections, we have not added Tobin’s q to the model. We have two reasons for this. First,
the empirical measurement of q requires data on prices and numbers of stock outstanding.
Concerning our sample, we are not able to come up with a proxy for q for many firms in our
sample. So, if we would estimate a q-model, the sample would have been decreased
considerably. Moreover, since data to construct q are in particular missing for stand-alone and
thus smaller firms, estimating a q-model would probably create a selection bias. Second, it is
well known that there are serious measurement problems with respect to q. Theoretically, a
measure of marginal q is needed. However, since marginal q is not observable, average q is
usually taken as a proxy. This probably introduces additional measurement problems. In our
case, sales proxies for future profitability.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) are the most prominent critics of the use of the investment-
cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints. They argue that the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow not necessarily increases monotonically as a firm is more financially
constrained. In particular, they show that the investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of
financing constraints breaks down for certain specifications of a firm’s cost and production
functions.
However, this critique only applies to situations where a higher investment-cash flow
sensitivity is interpreted as a more severe financing constraint. Therefore, this critique only16
applies to part of our results. In many cases, however, we find evidence that cash flow is
insignificant for group affiliates, whereas it is positively significant for stand-alone firms. In
these cases, we are not comparing different investment-cash flow sensitivities, and so the
critique does not hold.
#	 $
This paper studies the effect of business group affiliation on corporate investment behavior in
India. Estimating a standard accelerator cum cash-flow investment model, we find evidence
that cash flow has a positive and significant effect on investment spending of stand-alone
firms, whereas for group affiliates the cash flow coefficient is much lower or insignificant.
Taking account of measurement problems and endogeneity, we also estimate our model using
a system GMM estimator. The results from this estimation are consistent with our OLS
results. This suggests that business group affiliates have better access to external funds than
stand-alone firms, a conclusion that is broadly consistent with our hypothesis.
The two sub-samples of group affiliates and stand-alone firms differ with respect to
firm size, age and leverage. We also estimated our model while controlling for these
differences. We find that after controlling for firm size, our first results continue to hold.
After controlling for age, the results are less clear-cut, however. We do not consider this very
problematic, since age is only weakly related with business group affiliation. We interpret our
findings as an indication that business group affiliates in India have better access to external
capital than stand-alone companies.
Note that our result does not say anything about the efficiency of the investments.
Moreover, it would be interesting to find out if better access to external capital goes via other





The system GMM estimator combines the differenced equation with a levels equation to form
a system GMM. Lagged levels are used as instruments for the contemporaneous differences
and lagged differences as instruments for the contemporaneous levels. We adopt the system
GMM estimation procedure since first difference GMM may suffer from weak instruments
problems (Blundell and Bond (1998)). The coefficients we present, as well as the p-values,
refer to two step GMM estimates, based on robust, finite sample corrected standard errors
(Windmeijer, 2000). Note that the uncorrected two-step standard errors are severely biased
for small samples. Therefore, most researchers present coefficients and standard errors based
on one-step estimates. Windmeijer (2000) shows how the two step standard estimates can be
corrected, and that is the approach we have followed. 
14 In all estimations we control for time
effects by adding time dummies for 1990-1997. These time dummies are used as additional
instruments.
The reliability of the system GMM estimation procedure depends very much on the
validity of the instruments. We consider the validity of the instruments by presenting a Sargan
test. The Sargan test is a test on overidentifying restrictions. It is asymptotically distributed as
χ
2 and tests the null hypothesis of validity of the (overidentifying) instruments. P-values
report the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, so that a P value above 0.05
implies that the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null is above 0.05. In this case, a
higher P-value makes it more likely that the instruments are valid. We also test the reliability
of the instruments of the level equation by presenting the Difference Sargan test. The
Difference Sargan test is calculated by subtracting the value of the Sargan test of a first
differenced GMM estimate form the value of the Sargan test of the system GMM estimate.
The degrees of freedom of the Differenced Sargan test equals the degrees of freedom of the
system GMM Sargan test minus the first differenced Sargan test. The Differenced Sargan test
is also asymptotically distributed as χ
2 and tests the null hypothesis of validity of the
(overidentifying) instruments in the level equation. So, the levels equations instruments are18
not rejected if the calculated value of the Differenced Sargan test is lower than the theoretical
value of a χ
2 variable with n degrees of freedom.
The consistency of the estimates also depends on the absence of serial correlation in the
error terms. This will be the case if the differenced residuals display significant negative first
order serial correlation and no second order serial correlation. We present tests for first-order
and second-order serial correlation related to the estimated residuals in first differences. The
test statistics are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables. The null hypothesis
here relates to “insignificance” so that a low P-value for the test on first-order serial
correlation and a high P-value for the test on second-order serial correlation suggests that the
disturbances are not serially correlated. The serial correlation tests (M1 and M2 in the table)
refer to the one-step GMM estimates.
We also present Wald tests. These test statistics are also asymptotically distributed as
χ
2 variables. The Wald test tests for joint significance of all, or a subset of parameters. The
null hypothesis refers to “insignificance”, implying that low P-values suggest joint
significance.19
                                                          
1 Although Indian law has a common-law origin, law enforcement is typically much more difficult than
in the UK or the US (see La Porta et al. (1998)). For these reasons, banks may be more willing to lend
to group affiliates.
2 Khanna and Palepu (2000) may be an exception, but they used data for only one year, so that they are
not able to estimate a real dynamic investment model. Bhandari, Dasgupta and Gangopadhyay (2000)
also consider investment in group companies but their focus is on investment by financial institutions
in group companies.
3 This section draws heavily on Khanna, Palepu  and Wu (1998). Additional information has been
obtained from the Tata Group.
4 A notable exception is Bhandari Dasgupta and Gangopadhyay (2000) who, however, concentrate on
the role of development financial institutions in the investment behavior of group and standalone
companies.
5 Some outliers were deleted from the sample. In total, we deleted 10 firms (6 private firms and 4
group-related firms).
6 We note, however, that both firm size and capital structure are endogenous variables with respect to
firm investment and the degree of capital constraints. Simply because a firm suffers less from capital
constraints, it may be bigger or have more leverage. Business group affiliation, in contrast, does seen to
be rather constant over time. For our sample, all firms are either affiliated to a business group or not,
and this stays constant during our sample period. Business group affiliation can thus be considered
exogenous. Therefore, even if business group affiliation is highly correlated with firm size or capital
structure, it may still be a worthwhile exercise to compare investment behavior of group affiliates and
stand-alone firms.
7 Note that we only run this regression in order to find out which variables are significantly related to
group affiliation. The regression does not imply anything about causality. Regression results can be
obtained on request.
8 We also estimated a model where we included lagged investment as an explanatory variable, but this
did not change our results.
9 In our OLS estimates, we also experimented with using the median values instead of values for the
mean. This gave similar results.
10  Perotti and Gelfer (2001) find a negative cash flow coefficient for  firms in a centrally led group.
They see this as evidence for the existence of large intra group capital markets. In our case, that would
suggest that especially the younger firms in a group are financially interlinked. Since detailed data is
lacking we are not able to derive firm conclusions on this issue.
11 It appears that the significance of the sales coefficient depends very much on the exact set of
instruments.
12 Significance levels of the cash flow variables were robust to different combinations of instruments.
13 We also estimated our basic accelerator model for two different samples of firms, one for the stand-
alone firms and one for the group firms. These results also confirm that group firms have better access
to external capital than stand-alone firms. Results can be obtained on request.
14 We thank Frank Windmeijer for providing the package of DPD98 including the corrected two step
standard errors.20
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( 
a, b
All firms Group firms Stand-alone Difference T-stat. for
Difference
Panel A: summary statistics
Total assets 1884.79 2539.94 583.06 1956.88 11.26*** 
c
Age 33.95 35.29 31.28 4.00 6.58***
Debt-assets ratio 0.42 0.41 0.44 -0.03 3.27***
Sales 1580.20 2134.18 479.50 1654.68 15.00***
ROA 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 2.31**
Panel B: ownership structure
Foreign ownership 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.03 7.95***
Domestic Institutional
ownership
0.16 0.18 0.13 0.05 12.63***
Corporate ownership 0.31 0.35 0.24 0.10 18.87***
Directors’ ownership 0.10 0.06 0.20 -0.14 33.76***
Top 50 ownership 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.03 13.28***
Dispersed ownership 0.27 0.26 0.28 -0.02 5.12***
a Figures are averages for the 1989-1997 period.
b In panel A, total assets include fixed assets, investments, and current assets. Age is the number
of years from incorporation. The debt-assets ratio measures the total borrowings of a company as a
fraction of its total assets. Sales consist of the revenue generated from a firm’s main business activity.
The return on assets is measured as (profit after tax + dividends paid)/total assets.
The variables in panel B are defined as follows: foreign ownership is the ownership by foreign firms
and financial institutions. Domestic institutional ownership measures the ownership stake of all state-
run financial institutions. Corporate ownership measures the stake held by other companies, other than
those mentioned above. Director’s ownership is the stake owned by the directors and their relatives.
Top 50 ownership measures the stake held by the 50 largest shareholders, other than those in the above
categories. The rest of the shares is held by dispersed owners.




Borrower type All firms Group firms Stand-alone firms t-stat. for difference
Panel A: means
Bank 0.437 0.415 0.480 9.33*** 
c
Other financial institution 0.256 0.249 0.271 3.38***
Government 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.65
Group company 0.007 0.010 0.001 6.19***
Other company 0.027 0.028 0.024 2.14**




Bank 0.412 0.389 0.461 8.99***
Other financial institution 0.201 0.196 0.215 1.15
Government 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.48**
Group company 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.53***
Other company 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.22
Foreign 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.94*
a Figures are averages for the 1989-1997 period.
b This table compares components of corporate debt of group firms and stand-alone firms. The
components are measured as the share of total borrowings obtained from a type of borrower. Bank debt
includes both long- and short-term bank debt. Borrowings from the government include loans from
central government, state governments and government owned development institutions. Group
companies include holding companies, subsidiaries and group companies, i.e., companies under the
same management. Thus, stand-alone firms are not excluded by definition. Loans from other
companies represents loans from companies that are not included in group companies. Foreign
borrowing refers to foreign institutions, not foreign currency. Panel A gives the mean share of total
borrowings for a particular type of borrower, whereas Panel B gives the median shares.
c ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
d Denotes z-statistic for the outcome of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.24
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a
Mean Std dev. Min Max

All firms 0.091 0.301 -0.726 13.182
Group affiliates 0.089 0.200 -0.488 3.509
Stand-alone 0.094 0.437 -0.726 13.181

All firms 1.462 1.017 0.000 20.619
Group affiliates 1.464 1.110 0.000 20.619
Stand-alone 1.457 0.804 0.000 8.545

All firms 0.094 0.151 -3.837 3.909
Group affiliates 0.096 0.129 -3.837 1.393
Stand-alone 0.091 0.188 -1.370 3.909
















 0.50 0.28 1.0026
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a,b







































N 4788 4788 4788 4788 4788
RSS 587.50 578.82 585.87 568.04 585.02























a All variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, A. Dependent variable is
investment, measured as the change in gross fixed assets. Independent variables are sales, S, and cash
flow, CF. The dummy variables D1, D2, and D3 refer to group affiliation (1 if affiliated, 0 if not), size
(1 if small, 0 if large), and age (1 if young, 0 if old), respectively.
b P-values are in parentheses.
c WALDJS gives the test statistic for a Wald test of joint significance of the independent
variables; p-values are in parentheses.
d WALDTM gives the test statistic for a Wald test of the significance of the time dummies
(coefficients are not reported); p-values are in parentheses.27
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a All variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, A. Dependent variable is
investment, measured as the change in gross fixed assets. Independent variables are sales, S, and cash28
flow, CF. The dummy variables D1, D2, and D3 refer to group affiliation (1 if affiliated, 0 if not), size
(1 if small, 0 if large), and age (1 if young, 0 if old), respectively.
b P-values are in parentheses.
c For the equation in first differences, lagged levels are used as instruments. For the equation in
levels, first differences are used as instruments. Time dummies are also included as instruments. The
exact set of instruments differs per variable and per equation. It is determined by comparing the Sargan
test statistics of different possibilities. The exact set of instruments can be obtained on request.
d Equations 4 and 5 are estimated with Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse to evaluate the weighting
matrix. The reason is that the total number of instruments in these estimates are relatively large, leading
to difficulties in inverting the matrix required to compute the two-step GMM estimator.
e The degrees of freedom for the Differenced Sargan test are in square brackets.
f WALDJS gives the test statistic for a Wald test of joint significance of the independent
variables; p-values are in parentheses.
g WALDTM gives the test statistic for a Wald test of the significance of the time dummies
(coefficients are not reported); p-values are in parentheses.